CHAPTER 7

Theological Demands on Postmodern Life

Toward a Theology of the Life Cycle

This last chapter serves several purposes. First, I want to come back to some of the questions and problems that we encountered in the beginning of the book. The issue of the postmodern life cycle, which I have traced through childhood, adolescence, postadolescence, adulthood, and old age, and the challenges that the changing shape of the life cycle entails for church and theology are the main topics of this chapter. In this sense, my study is meant to be a contribution to Christian praxis as it encounters the needs and challenges of contemporary life and culture.

Second, the encounter with the postmodern life cycle also implies far-reaching theoretical questions that concern the nature of practical theology in its relationship to postmodernity. Does this relationship allow for practical theology to stay the same? Or is there a need for a new practical theology–a new paradigm as some people like to call it, a postmodern paradigm of practical theology?

Third, this chapter will address the question of theological demands on postmodern life, as I called it in the first chapter of this book. So far, my main emphasis has been on the demands posed by postmodernity. Consequently, my focus was on adaptations to be made by church and theology in order to keep pace with postmodernity. But as we have seen in several respects throughout

this study, this is not the whole story. We also have to be explicit in the opposite direction by making theology our starting point and by asking about theological demands on postmodern life. What are the demands or criteria that can help theology move toward a critical and constructive encounter with postmodernity? What kind of practical theology do we need for this purpose?

It may be helpful to start by reviewing some of the questions concerning this kind of theology and by summing up some of the pertinent arguments contained in the chapters of this book.

Open Questions

It seems fair to say that, on the whole, practical theology has not fully dealt with the issue of postmodernity.[1] In part, especially in Western Europe, this is due to the second thoughts that have been raised about the idea of postmodernity. Does postmodernity really exist? Will the concept of postmodernity help us in diagnosing contemporary culture or is it actually a misleading and, at best, shaky category? While the idea of postmodernity is considered vague or even depressive and nostalgic, concepts of modernity and modernization still exert a continuing influence on the European side of the Atlantic. In the United States, however, the concept of postmodernity seems much more accepted, and a considerable number of theological studies have taken it up, most notably in exegesis and in systematic theology.[2] Yet even in the North American discussion, at least to my knowledge, no major study on practical theology and postmodernity has been published yet.

The hesitancy to be observed with practical theology vis-à-vis postmodernity may also be due to the empirical aspects connected to this concept. In this respect, the situation appears quite unclear. Philosophical analyses such as, for example, the accounts offered by David Harvey or Wolfgang Welsch have been widely accepted as standard views on postmodernity.[3] But are these views also valid empirically with respect to contemporary forms of everyday life? May we presuppose, for example, that the stages of the life cycle have actually changed according to the expectations formulated in philosophy? In general, practical theologians tend to be hesitant to base their understandings and their models of praxis on theoretical and philosophical concepts that have not been established on empirical grounds. And given the fact that some social scientists still consider it unlikely that a postmodern self has actually replaced the modern self, there are good reasons for practical theology to take a

more guarded position on the issue of postmodernity.[4] In any case, a more empirical and inductive approach is needed if practical theology is to address the demands of postmodern life.

Yet at the same time, the issue of postmodernity holds a special challenge to practical theology that, if taken seriously, actually makes postmodernity a most pressing issue for practical theology. If it is true, as it is often stated in textbooks, that practical theology as an academic discipline is a child of modernity, then one must wonder if the advent of postmodernity implies that there is no more need for this kind of endeavor. Does the advent of postmodernity, if it exists, mark the end of practical theology? Or, if not, does it call for a new paradigm for practical theology? And if so, how can this child of modernity come of age in postmodern times?

In the approach that I have used in the present study as well as in earlier work on which this study is based, I attempt to combine both questions mentioned above by asking about the changes to be observed empirically with the contemporary life cycle on the one hand, and by asking what these changes imply for practical theology on the other.[5] My choice of the life cycle as the main aspect of postmodernity to be studied is due to the special interest that this aspect holds for practical theology. This special interest is connected to the practical work in church and society that is to be informed and guided by practical theology. At the same time, this interest refers to the relationship between practical theology and postmodernity on a theoretical level. To make the life cycle a central topic of practical theology or to develop a practical theology along the stages of the life cycle can be considered a typically modern approach. This can be seen from the widespread attention that this kind of practical theology has received over the last thirty or forty years, especially in the field of pastoral counseling, where textbooks often take this approach.[6] The view implied in this kind of practical theology is based on the modern understanding of individual life as a presupposition for theology. More specifically, it is the life of the autonomous individual that, according to this view, determines the horizon that modern practical theology must accept as its starting point.[7] Consequently, considering the relationship between the changes of the life cycle and practical theology may help us in gaining a better understanding of the current situation of practical theology.

My focus on the changes of the life cycle in the present study is also motivated by the search for an inductive approach to the question of postmodernity. As mentioned in chapter 1, this inductive approach cannot be naïve in that it is in fact impossible to approach phenomena

such as postmodernity in an exclusively empirical manner. Throughout this study, we had to make use of concepts and categories from the philosophical discussion in order to decipher contemporary experiences. Yet by asking about postmodern life and about the postmodern life cycle rather than limiting ourselves to a philosophical analysis, we could at least get closer to the actual experiences and concerns of contemporary people.

If practical theology's concern with contemporary experience is not to end up with a merely adaptive approach and with asking about *postmodern demands on theology,* we must also become clear about criteria for *theological demands on postmodern life.* The preceding chapters of the present study actually contain at least some initial considerations on such criteria or critical perspectives, but we have not yet put them together into a more comprehensive statement. This is why I will set forth what I call a theology of the life cycle—or, to be more modest, the demand and the parameters for such a theological account.

A first step toward this aim is to formulate some summary observations concerning the contemporary life cycle.

Understanding the Postmodern Life Cycle

As mentioned above, at least for some social scientists it is an open question whether or not there are enough grounds for speaking of a postmodern life cycle. According to those analysts, it is not enough to look only at the philosophical notions of postmodernity and to then assume that peoples' lives or life cycles will have changed more or less in accordance with the theoretical assumptions on postmodernity. Theoretical expectations and the realities of life do not always coincide. Even in postmodernity, life is more complex and more varied than even the most pluralist theory may assume.

Taking the warnings against premature assumptions about a postmodern life cycle seriously, my approach to the topic was inductive by contrasting the ideal description of the *modern life cycle* (which, from a postmodern perspective, has to be considered the traditional life cycle) with the changes and challenges of the *contemporary–possibly postmodern–situation.* This kind of comparison has at least given us an idea of the empirical aspects of postmodern life.

It is, of course, quite impossible to summarize the changes related to the contemporary life cycle here in a few statements, which would amount to condensing the earlier chapters of this book into a few pages. So I will limit myself to a general picture that can highlight some of the core characteristics of this situation.

The main result arising from the consideration of the stages or phases of the life cycle that I have used as my test cases is that the life cycle has indeed changed in a fundamental way. The changes affect not only the experiences that make up the *content* of the various stages of the life cycle but also its very *structure* and *fabric* by giving, for example, rise to new stages like postadolescence or by redefining the existing ones, such as in the case of a Third Age. In this sense, it is justified to speak of a postmodern life cycle in order to distinguish it from its modern counterpart as described, for example, by psychologists like Erik Erikson. The changes that can be observed today affect the meaning of all parts or stages of the life cycle. While we may still speak of childhood, adolescence, adulthood, or old age, all of these terms have clearly assumed a new meaning. At the same time, it is obvious that new and additional periods of the life cycle have emerged and that they are demanding to be acknowledged in their own right: postadolescence, midlife crises, and the various subphases of old age to only mention the more well-known examples. Be it with the new meaning of traditional terms or with the emergence of new stages of the life cycle, it can hardly be doubted that we are, in fact, observing changes of the life cycle that may not easily be captured with the traditional understanding of the modern life cycle. The idea of the modern life cycle still is a backdrop or reference point for helpful comparisons, but it may no longer be considered as an accurate account of today's experience. And it is even less likely to offer us a normative vision amid the crises of contemporary life.

All stages of the life cycle considered above are not just changing by degree. Rather, they have lost some of the key characteristics by which they used to be defined.

- *Childhood* no longer is the relatively quiet time of stability to be experienced and enjoyed in a stable family. Rather, the changes of the family have made childhood a time with many transitions and with new pressures that arise again and again from early on. Literally as well as metaphorically speaking, being a child no longer means living in the safe haven of a home to which one will always look back as the true anchor of one's personal identity.
- Similarly, *adolescence* has ceased to be the time when one develops a lifelong commitment to a clear-cut or at least stable identity and to a worldview that would provide a deep sense of direction in life. In many cases, the experience of being a plural self and of living with plural identities has come to replace such

traditional commitments. Plurality has become the inescapable condition for today's adolescence.

- In addition to this, adolescence no longer borders on adulthood but rather on *postadolescence* as a new stage of the life cycle. The transition between adolescence and adulthood has turned into a protracted period of time, with important implications for faith development and for the issue of religious affiliation and disaffiliation.
- Even *adulthood,* which once, even in modern psychology, appeared as the longest and most continuous or stable period within the life cycle, has come into question. None of the modern criteria of being "adult" may be taken for granted anymore. Neither autonomy nor rationality and progressive achievement are still acceptable as true descriptions of adulthood. And at the same time, global economic developments and the media even threaten the status of adulthood itself by not allowing for financial independence or by redefining the value of traditional knowledge that used to be one of the defining privileges of adulthood.
- *Old age* has changed no less. Given the changes within late adulthood and old age, it no longer makes sense to think only of the time of senility or dependence that almost inevitably comes at the end of life. The ideas of a Third Age with new potential and with new exciting possibilities indicates how much the understanding of the period after retirement today can differ from the views maintained only twenty or thirty years ago. The needs of people in the Third Age are not for supportive care. Rather, there now is a clear demand for having a chance to realize some of what one's life did not permit at earlier times.

Given such changes, which have been established by the numerous detailed studies considered in earlier chapters, the question of the postmodern life cycle may now receive at least a somewhat clearer answer. It is true that there are far-reaching changes in the human life cycle. And since these are changes that so clearly differ from the expectations connected to the modern idea of the life cycle, there are indeed good reasons for speaking of a *post*modern life cycle. But in making this statement, the objections against some understandings of postmodernity should also not be overlooked. One of the main objections concerns the identification of postmodernity only by what is lost in the transition from modernity. Often, especially

in theology and the church, the loss of a unifying center of norms and values is deplored, and the breakdown of all "master stories" is seen as a threat to the proclamation of the gospel. Yet there is no reason to think of the contemporary situation only as a time of loss, be it in terms of the individual person or be it with respect to church and theology. In many ways, church and theology are facing new challenges, and the postmodern life cycle certainly is not better than its precursors. Yet postmodernity also entails new chances and new potential for human life, which now can be liberated from the narrow visions of rational autonomy and of progressive achievement.

So in some sense, it may be helpful to consider the different terminology that analysts such as Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck have suggested in place of the concept of postmodernity.[8] According to them, we should speak of a *second modernity*—a modernity that may also be called *reflexive modernity* in that it includes, even in calling itself modernity, the critical awareness of the shortcomings and of the dark sides of modernity. As opposed to some of the postmodern worldviews, the critical awareness of reflexive modernity is to prevent any kind of depressive nostalgia for the allegedly better times of modernity or even premodernity. Rather, the concept of "reflexive modernization" is to serve as a basis for the continued attempt of counteracting and overcoming the flaws of modernity while still holding on to what is worth preserving of it. To speak of the *life cycle* in the sense of *reflexive modernity* would then imply to consciously hold on to the idea of a meaningful life or of a good life, which is the normative vision built into the modern idea of the life cycle. It would mean to preserve this idea even while realizing, at the same time, that the traditional (that is, "modern") notions of identity and autonomy are highly ambivalent and are much too narrow for being the guiding norms for the life cycle in second modernity. This way of viewing the modern life cycle clearly is in line with the results of my own considerations of the stages of the modern life cycle above. In many cases, be it with modern views of the family and of childhood religion, with adolescent identity formation, or with so-called adult independence, the ambivalence of modern expectations has become obvious. So it makes sense to speak of the need for "reflexive modernization" in respect to the life cycle.

The reflexive and critical perspective on the life cycle is also of immediate interest for practical theology. Many or most of the changes to be observed with the contemporary life cycle also refer to religion or at least have religious implications. Starting in early childhood through adolescence and into adulthood, the substructures of religious

nurture, development, and education are being rearranged. So it is easy to see why, for example, many who work with today's children, adolescents, or adults in the church or in related fields of education feel threatened by the far-reaching changes of life structures and orientations. And it is also clear that, as the life cycle is changing, the forms of addressing the people who are moving through this life cycle will also have to change. The postmodern life cycle calls for postmodern approaches in the praxis of the church.

What the perspective of a second–*reflexive*–modernity adds to this picture is a critical and constructive perspective with which this situation can be approached. Rather than deploring the losses of postmodernity and rather than becoming desperate with its pluriformities, this perspective may encourage us to ask about the *possibilities* of the postmodern life cycle. In my understanding, it must be the task of a contemporary practical theology to become a *practical theology of reflexive modernization* and to serve as a *mediator* and *midwife* for those possibilities.

In order to illustrate this understanding, I conclude this section by connecting it with some of the considerations from my analysis of the changing shape of adulthood (in chapter 5). As pointed out there, modernity has been especially productive in terms of images of adulthood. In some ways, we may say that modernity itself was closely connected with the proud hope of the Enlightenment, that humanity had finally reached adulthood and maturity. Modern adulthood is often identified with autonomy, independence, and rationality. This understanding also affects religion, which is limited to the role of supporting rational autonomy, especially in the realm of ethics. And even more, religion does not have a proper place in modern adulthood. In the meantime, however, the modern idea of adulthood has itself been challenged as an ideology. It never included those who were prevented from becoming fully autonomous, independent, and rational. And in addition to this, the modern understanding of adulthood cannot cover the varieties of postmodern life, be it with new lifestyles or with new interests in religion and spirituality. Here, with the idea of modern adulthood, the postmodern challenges are by no means only detrimental. Rather, they include healthy possibilities, and they provide a new openness at exactly those points where the modern life cycle tended to become suffocating.

Practical Theology between Modernity and Postmodernity

The traditional or, more accurately, the original understanding of practical theology as an academic discipline is closely tied to the

emergence of modernity in the eighteenth century. When Friedrich Schleiermacher, who often is considered the father of practical theology, and his contemporaries designed the project of practical theology as a separate branch or subdiscipline of theology, they worked against the background of the challenges posed by modernity and the Enlightenment. One of the main challenges was to show that religion and the church were not just remnants of the Dark Ages of premodernity but that they have a meaningful future role to play.[9] This is why Schleiermacher attempted to show that human existence is incomplete and impoverished if religion is not given its proper place in human life. Moreover, he argues that the church can be conceived of as an institution for the religious communication that is needed for enabling the individual persons to express their religious feelings and, in turn, to be stimulated by the preaching and teaching of the church. In all of this, the main challenge consisted in the sharp tension between the Christian tradition on the one hand and modern culture on the other. This is why practical theology was designed as a mediator–a mediator between tradition and modernity, between religion and rationality, and between the church and the life worlds of modernity.[10]

Given the close relationship between modernity and the emergence of practical theology as a new theological discipline, it is obvious why postmodernity intrinsically implies a fundamental challenge for practical theology. If we have actually moved beyond the scope of modernity–and the changes of the modern life cycle may be taken as an empirical indication of this move–the task of mediating between the Christian tradition and modernity is also affected. This is why the issue of postmodernity is so pressing for practical theology. It actually confronts this discipline with the question of its future existence and also with the need to reconsider its mediating task.

Is there still a need for mediation between the Christian tradition and contemporary experience once we have moved beyond modernity? In my understanding, the answer must clearly be "yes." The characteristics of postmodernity that are described in the literature–pluralization, individualization, the end of all "master stories," and so forth–indicate that the move beyond modernity or, to again use this terminology, the arrival of a second modernity, does not mean that contemporary culture and society are returning to the premodern unity of Christianity, culture, and society.[11] Even if the contemporary situation includes, as will be pointed out later in this chapter, a certain return to religion, it is not institutionalized religion

in the sense of the Christian church that has received renewed attention. Rather, it is spirituality in the sense of a personal religious interest without institutional affiliation. Consequently, the future role of practical theology may still be described with the term "mediator." What has changed, however, is the polarity that makes theological mediation necessary, but the task of mediation itself has not disappeared. In my understanding, the task of mediation now refers to the tensions arising in the transition between modernity and postmodernity or between first modernity and second modernity.

In this understanding, practical theology as mediator is related to a temporal and cultural transition from first to second modernity. We are talking about the conflictual sequence of two different epochs or of two different cultures, and the task of practical theology as mediator is to support the church in this transition as well as to offer guidance to a wider public. This task necessarily also includes a social dimension of practical theology. Given the impact of pluralization, individualization, distance from institutions, and so forth, practical theology can only do its job of mediation by facilitating productive connections between church, individual religion, and the public.

If we consider again, for the sake of being more specific, the changing stages of the life cycle mentioned above, it seems obvious to me that practical theology as mediator must tap into what we have called the potential of postmodernity vis-à-vis the procrustean bed of the modern life cycle. But it has also become clear that we cannot accept, let alone uncritically praise, whatever calls itself postmodern. Rather, we need a careful and critical examination of the diverse changes between modernity and postmodernity in order to identify what may really be called a potential and what rather should be seen as detrimental. To put it into one sentence: Support for helpful postmodern developments but also critical resistance to what cannot be accepted of postmodernity–this is the substantial work of practical theology as mediator between the first and second modernity.

In a further step, this general statement must be related to religion–especially to the relationship between church, individual religion, and the public.[12] Again, we encounter an ambivalent situation. Modernity has worked toward separating the different fields of religion. The public realm was conceived of as secular or, if not so, as undergirded by some type of civil religion. The religion of the individual person was confined to the private realm (religious privatization). Consequently, the distance among church, the public realm, and individual life was not only increased empirically but it was turned, at least in part, into a permanent situation guarded by

legal as well as political principles. In this view, the public realm must be secular, individual persons must keep their religious "preferences" to themselves as long as they are in public, and the church is not to interfere with this situation of clear-cut separation.

From social scientific as well as from theological analyses of postmodernity, it may be seen that the interplay among church, individual religion, and the public realm does not stay the same with postmodernity. There are new chances for religion to claim a stronger role in public life, for example, through the various political movements that are motivated by religion.[13] Yet at the same time, it is difficult to see how religion may actually play this role if religion, for the most part, is increasingly individualized and privatized. Also, the position of the church clearly becomes weaker if more and more people see no connection between their personal faith and the teachings of the church. This is why the work of practical theology as mediator must include a social dimension. In being a midwife for the religious potential of second modernity, it must mediate among church, individual religion, and the public realm.

In this case, mediation means building connections and making voices heard. As theologians concern themselves with the postmodern life cycle, they are showing a new willingness to listen to the people and to become open to their actual life experiences. This clearly is a first step toward strengthening the relationship between the church and the individual person. The next step will be to devise additional strategies—be it in preaching or teaching, in liturgy or in pastoral care—strategies that address the needs of those who have to find their way through the postmodern life cycle.

In some ways, mediating between the church and the individual person has always been the task of practical theology. The other tension, however—the tension between church and public life or between individual religion and the public—has received far less attention. Yet the task is clear in this respect as well. If the church is to claim a stronger role in public life, it must itself become what may be called a *public community*—a community that brings together, in a convincing manner, the strength of forming communal bonds as they arise from a particular faith and from a particular ethos, and the universal responsibility for the common good of all citizens and of all human beings.

To put it in a nutshell: The task of practical theology in its social dimension includes the threefold focus on church, individual religion, and the public, as well as on the dynamic interrelationships among all three of them. So practical theology, as I understand it, must be a theological discipline with a theoretical horizon that is much wider

than the traditional definitions of this discipline, which relate it only to pastoral work within the church. I clearly affirm the ecclesial focus of practical theology because religious institutions are necessary. But we must also extend practical theology to refer to individual life and to the role of religion in the public sphere.[14]

If practical theology is to fulfill this task, it is in need of clear theological criteria. These criteria must enable it to critically assess the transitional process from first to second modernity, and they must also offer guidance for the mediating work of practical theology in the dynamic interrelationship of church, individual religion, and the public. In order to show what this means, I will again refer to the life cycle by asking how a theological perspective on the life cycle may be articulated.

The relationship between practical theology and postmodernity is in need of a more detailed discussion. The present chapter certainly is not meant to be exhaustive. It is focused on the question of what postmodernity means for our understanding of the tasks of practical theology. Postmodernity does not imply the end of practical theology as mediation, but it makes it mandatory to reassess and to redesign the ways in which this mediation is to be carried out.

Do we need a new paradigm for practical theology? The reference to a "new paradigm" is always ambivalent if it refers to the present in which one lives. Actually, if taken seriously, the concept of paradigm as developed by Thomas Kuhn[15] implies that those who are working within a certain paradigm are not aware of it. The paradigm is operative behind their backs. It is nothing that can be introduced intentionally. So my point is not about the term "paradigm" and my plea is not for an intentional change of paradigms (which would be a contradiction in terms). My plea is for a practical theology facing up to the challenges of contemporary life, which, in important respects, is no longer "modern" in the traditional sense.

Toward a Theology of the Life Cycle

The step that I want to take in this final section confronts us with a somewhat paradoxical task. On the one hand, in the interest of the criteria needed for practical theology in the transition between modernity and postmodernity, theology now must be our starting point—or, more exactly, we need a theological perspective on the life cycle. Yet on the other hand, such a theological perspective is not readily available. To my knowledge, there is no publication available from systematic theology or from theological ethics that would offer a "theology of the life cycle," at least not from recent times.[16] Of course, there are accounts from pastoral theology and from Christian

education that deal with parts or aspects of the life cycle for purposes of counseling and education.[17] But with very few exceptions—most notably James Loder's book on *Human Development in Theological Perspective*[18]—they do not offer a comprehensive theological perspective on the life cycle as a whole. And even Loder's approach, on which I will draw implicitly, does not focus on the postmodern life cycle but rather is meant as a critical dialogue with the psychology of human development independent of the life cycle in modernity or postmodernity.

Given the enormous attention that the modern life cycle has received in the second half of the twentieth century, and given the challenges that postmodernity is setting before us, it is probably not unfair to say that theology has not done its homework in this respect. It is clearly not enough to rely only on theological doctrines and principles that have not entered the dialogue with the experiences connected to the postmodern life cycle. If theology is to offer guidance and support in the transition from first to second modernity, a theology of the life cycle is an indispensable presupposition for the critical discernment and mediation of practical theology.

So what are we to do in this situation? It is clear what we need, but what we need is not available. It will certainly not be possible to fill this gap in the last section of this book, and I will not pretend that I am in the position to offer a comprehensive model. What is possible, however, is to set forth a number of key points or perspectives that, at least in my understanding, identify the decisive issues to be included in a theology of the life cycle. And by putting together some of the theological understandings developed in earlier chapters of this book, we can at least work toward a first outline for a theology of the life cycle, which can be used as a scaffolding for future work.

The task of a theology of the life cycle is to set forth a theological interpretation of the life cycle and of its different stages. This interpretation must include answers to at least three questions, which are of key importance to the people moving through this life cycle.

- What aspects of the *Christian faith* are of special importance at the different stages? How does this faith address the issues of different phases of the life cycle?

- What *ethical guidelines* does this faith include with respect to different ages, stages, or phases of life?

- How is *religious communication* possible vis-à-vis the postmodern challenges of the pluralization, individualization, and privatization of religion?

All three questions stand for perspectives or for demands that theology raises over against the postmodern life cycle. At the same time, they indicate where theological work has to go beyond its traditional understanding if it is to be in touch with postmodern life.

(1) First, I take up the perspective of *faith*. How is the Christian understanding of faith related to the postmodern life cycle? It has been one of the central achievements of practical theology in the second half of the twentieth century to identify images and stories that correlate most exactly with the specific experiences of different stages of the life cycle. Such theological correlations most often make use of Erikson's model, which indicates that they actually refer to the *modern life cycle*. By summarizing and synthesizing the different models that practical theologians and Christian educators have set forth in the literature, we can draw up a correlational chart that looks something like this:[19]

Crises of the (Modern) Life Cycle	Religious/Christian Symbols
basic trust vs. mistrust	the numinous (God, mother, goddesses), the (lost) paradise, and the hope for the kingdom of God
autonomy vs. shame and doubt	good and evil, grace, obedience and exodus, symbols of eating and drinking
initiative vs. guilt	loving and punishing father Godhead, sin and redemption, repentance
industry vs. inferiority	vocation/calling, God's creation and responsibility, works
identity vs. identity confusion	God's solidarity (in suffering), alienation and redemption
intimacy vs. isolation	community, themes of christology
generativity vs. stagnation	creation, vocation/calling, care for the future
integrity vs. despair	the holy, the last thing

This summary chart obviously is based on the *modern* life cycle, not only because it incorporates Erikson's stages but also because the

conflicts and ambivalence connected to the postmodern situation are missing. And the same is true for the new possibilities that this situation includes according to the evaluations of my own study presented above. This does not mean that the correlational efforts contained in the chart have become worthless. As we have seen at many points, the changes to be observed with our contemporary situation have not taken away the expectations connected to the modern life cycle altogether. But there can be no doubt that the traditional (modern) crises of the life cycle do not sufficiently capture the experiences of contemporary people anymore. Consequently, the task of a theology of the postmodern life cycle consists of recasting such correlations in the light of the contemporary changes of this life cycle.

The task of redrawing the chart above in order to make it fit the postmodern life cycle is complex and demanding, and I think it would be premature to actually produce a new chart. But it makes sense to indicate the principles for the construction of such a new correlational chart by drawing on the chapters above, and to specify at least a number of examples for which religious or Christian symbols could become important in the present situation. For the sake of a simplified description, I will only refer to childhood, adolescence, and adulthood.

Childhood: The symbols suggested in the *modern* chart above are often geared to the experience of growing up with mother and father, of being raised with clear and demanding educational standards, and of struggling with the sometimes overwhelming authority of the adult generation. What seems to be less in view is the experience of growing up with only one parent, the absence of the father even in a two-parent household, the lack of clear standards and expectations, and the vulnerability of parents or educators who are puzzled by the question of what authority they should use after all. These *postmodern* experiences clearly lead to an entire set of crises that are different from those expected in the model of the modern life cycle. Different problems are becoming important, like issues of trustworthiness vis-à-vis parents who turn out not to be trustworthy, the experience of loss and abandonment, the need for hope and for guidance. These themes are also present in the Christian tradition, but symbols or stories must now be selected and be presented in line with what have become typical conflicts of contemporary childhood.

The symbol of the good shepherd (Lk. 15:1–7), for example, certainly remains important, but it can also take on new meaning for those who have never had a chance to experience a truly shepherding parent. Or to mention another example, the story of Jonah being lost on a journey and of having to survive a state of limbo certainly will

be attractive to children who themselves feel that they have gotten lost somewhere along their families' journeys.

Another set of problems has to do with the tension between belonging and openness described in chapter 2. If a pluralism of religions and worldviews has become a reality for many children from early experiences, they also need symbols and stories to support them in sorting out the potentially disorienting effects.

Adolescence: The crises and conflicts addressed in the *modern* chart reflect experiences of oppression and of liberation, that is, of a self that has to struggle to free itself from overwhelming social expectations and from predefined social roles. Again, while issues of oppression and liberation remain important, the specifically *postmodern* exposure to pluralization and individualization is lacking in this modern interpretation. The challenges of plural selves and plural identities described in chapter 3 include the experience of incompleteness and of discontinuity. Vis-à-vis the danger of fragmentation that this experience entails, the positive acceptance of the fragmentary character of the human self as an expression of human finitude can give the young person a new and encouraging sense of selfhood. This is especially true if the acceptance of one's limits is not due only to resignation or frustration with oneself but if it comes also in response to the experience of God's love and acceptance, which are not based on personal achievements. This is why I pointed to the crucial importance of the teaching of the justification by faith, which means exactly this—that human selfhood is not an achievement but, in the first place, a gift from God. And the insight into the deeply relational character of human existence implied by this teaching can help young people in overcoming the widespread individualistic views of the self and in finding a sense of direction vis-à-vis the relativism such views imply.

Adulthood: I intentionally do not distinguish here between (proper) adulthood and old age. This distinction on which the *modern* chart is based has turned out to be ideological in that it limits the status of being truly adult to those in full possession of autonomy and independence. This tendency is paralleled by associating work-related symbols such as vocation to the age of adulthood, and symbols such as the "last things" to old age. The *postmodern* experience challenges us, as shown in chapters 5 and 6, to thoroughly rethink such expectations and to make space for new understandings of adulthood, as well as old age.

For what used to be called (proper) adulthood, we need symbols that can support alternative visions of maturity by reconciling the

idea of adulthood with dependence and relatedness, with weakness, and with emotional or playful attitudes. In other words, if our understanding of what it means to be truly adult were to be broadened, the characteristics excluded or suppressed by modernity would, out of necessity, be reemphasized and reintegrated.

The situation is somewhat different with what I called, drawing on Peter Laslett's work in chapter 6, the Third Age, which used to be considered as late adulthood. Here, the emphasis must be on symbols and models of people who, in spite of their not being adolescents anymore, still found the courage and energy to start something new. The biblical archetypes for this certainly are Abraham's relocating to Canaan and Moses' leading the exodus, but there also are women like Miriam (Ex. 15:20) whose importance has recently been rediscovered.

Much more could be said about the meaning of faith in different postmodern contexts of life. Yet the principles that can lead to a more comprehensive account are clear enough. We need religious or Christian symbols that speak to the postmodern experience as opposed to modernity, that offer critical guidance to people vis-à-vis agnosticism and relativism, and that support the efforts of making use of new possibilities implicit in the postmodern situation. In this way, the attempt of correlating the Christian tradition and contemporary experiences is carried out in the sense of what I called the midwife function of practical theology.

Yet as important as the correlational task will be for the future of practical theology, we still have to go one step farther. The idea of correlating the Christian tradition with contemporary experiences of the life cycle actually includes a presupposition that, in postmodernity, can no longer be taken for granted. This presupposition refers to the fundamental question: Why should we even think of such correlations? If postmodernity means the end of all "master stories," it could also mean that a theological perspective on the life cycle is simply not needed any longer.

At this point, a theology of the life cycle has to go beyond individual correlations and to establish itself on the level of fundamental anthropology. In other words, a theology of the life cycle has to show that the question of faith is actually built into the human life cycle as such and therefore is not dependent on the experience of modernity. Birth and death, trust and anxiety, autonomy and dependence, identity and the denial of selfhood—all these experiences are potentially religious experiences. They carry with them a deep demand for ultimate answers—a demand that obviously is not only

stated by theologians but is experienced by many people. Postmodernity may be the end of all "master stories," but it clearly does not put an end to the questions of faith as they arise from the life cycle.

Summarizing the first task of a theology of the life cycle, we can distinguish between two different aspects—on the one hand, to bring into conversation with each other the Christian tradition and the experiences of the postmodern life cycle in the sense of correlation, and, on the other, to show on the level of fundamental anthropology how faith and the life cycle belong together even beyond modernity.

(2) The second task of a theology of the life cycle refers to the perspective of *Christian ethics*. This perspective refers to two different aspects or levels that must be addressed: the level of a *responsible individual life* and the level of *responsibility for the life cycle*.

Responsible individual life: This level concerns the question of how the individual person should live and act. Where Christian ethics and practical theology have addressed this question, they have done so in terms of moral guidelines for finding one's way through the life cycle and also in terms of the virtues that might be helpful and important in individual life. On the whole, there have not been many attempts, however, to relate the perspective of Christian ethics to the various stages of the life cycle in a comprehensive manner. This is why we turn again, for the last time in this book, to Erik Erikson, whose work on the modern life cycle also includes important ethical aspects.

Erikson often refers to ethical aspects as part of his view of the life cycle and of the developmental tasks connected to it. His most comprehensive treatment of the topic can be found in his essay "A Schedule of Virtues."[20] There he develops an interpretation of his eight stages of the life cycle, which focuses on the virtues that should be developed at each stage. His descriptions are summarized in the overview below.

It is interesting to note that many of these virtues come from the Christian tradition or can at least be interpreted in a Christian sense. This is especially true for *hope* and *fidelity*, but it also applies to *love, care,* and *wisdom*. This makes this chart of ethical perspectives in correlation to the stages of the life cycle a valuable potential contribution to a theology of the life cycle.

Yet it is also easy to see that we have to go beyond Erikson's modern scheme if we want to address the postmodern life cycle. Taking up Erikson's terminology of virtues, we must add new virtues that correspond to the challenges of postmodern life described in the

Stages of the life cycle	Virtues
Infancy	hope
Early childhood	will
Childhood	purpose
School age	competence
Adolescence	fidelity
Young adulthood	love
Adulthood	care
Old age	wisdom

previous chapters. For example, Erikson's scheme does not foresee a clear place for virtues like critical discernment vis-à-vis pluralism or for the dialogical and relational abilities that are called for by the need to overcome contemporary individualism. In a similar vein, the virtue of responsibility has rightfully received new attention in feminist psychology.[21] Such examples indicate the need to have a fresh look at the ethical tasks connected to an individual's life under the conditions of postmodernity. There is a need for ethical guidelines and virtues, even in postmodernity. Yet the ethical challenge runs deeper, and this is why a Christian ethics of the life cycle has to address a second level—ethical issues not only *within* the life cycle but responsibility *for* the life cycle itself.

Responsibility for the life cycle: The starting point for assuming responsibility for the life cycle is the insight repeated over and over in the chapters above, that the life cycle—actually any life cycle, postmodern or not—is not just a natural given. As has been pointed out above, the shape of the life cycle is thoroughly dependent on influences from culture and society. If this is true, the life cycle itself can, and from my point of view also must, be seen as a field of ethical responsibility. Since the life cycle is not an anthropological given that never changes, we ourselves become responsible for how the life cycle is shaped and what structures are given to it.

At first glance, it may not sound very plausible to identify this kind of responsibility as a key task of Christian ethics. In modernity, the main concern between theology and a psychology of the life cycle seemed to be how theology and the church can become more sensitive to the different ages and stages of the human life cycle that they want to address. And like many other modern topics, this question has not lost its importance. It is still quite essential, for example, that Christian

educators learn to really understand children in their unique ways of approaching the world. Yet at the same time, the postmodern life cycle makes us painfully aware of how flexible and how contingent all ages and stages of the life cycle really are. Childhood today and the childhood of our grandparents have little in common, and the lives of our children will probably again be very different from ours. This is why the postmodern life cycle poses a different and additional challenge to theology—the responsibility for shaping the life cycle itself. What does this mean?

To state it once more: The process through which the life cycle is changing is not a natural given. It is the result of social, political, and cultural processes, and this implies that there are decisions involved—decisions that are made at various levels and that together lead to the changes of the life cycle. There are the decisions of individuals, who make their choices for certain lifestyles or careers. There are decisions of churches, which make policies, for example, in respect to supporting or not supporting families. And there are decisions in politics, which affect the social and economic parameters of the life cycle in all of society.

All these decisions play into what finally appears as the given ("natural") shape and structure of the life cycle. The challenge that theological ethics puts before us today is how such decisions can be made in a responsible manner and in accordance with Christian views of the person and of society. In other words, the new flexibility and pluriformity also open up new possibilities for consciously shaping the life cycle, or more modestly, they make us aware of how policy decisions will inevitably influence the shape of the life cycle.

Given this situation, there is an increasingly pressing need for theology and the church to become clear about what forms of childhood, adolescence, adulthood, and so forth are healthy and humane from their perspective. This is why a theology of the life cycle has become an immensely important task, not only for responsible life within the life cycle but also in order to claim a Christian responsibility for the future shape of the life cycle.

(3) The third question that a theology of the life cycle must address—the question of *religious communication*—is of a somewhat different nature. It is less obvious than the first two questions of faith and of responsibility. Why does the question of religious communication arise in this context?

Again we are confronted with a specific challenge of postmodern life. Religious communication becomes extremely difficult and diffuse in postmodernity. This is because of the two interrelated processes of

the pluralization and the individualization of religion, which, in extreme cases, may mean that a language may not even be available that would be suitable for purposes of religious communication. When everything about religion is left to the individual to pursue from early years, there often is no chance for children or youth to acquire such a language. Faith or religion then remains a purely private matter pertaining only to inner feelings that cannot be shared with others. Even where this is not the case and where such a language is still acquired through education, religious discourse in public becomes difficult because, once religion is treated as a purely private matter, religious language is seen as limited to a religious community. And indeed, the traditional forms of Christian language have rarely been developed for the purposes of public dialogue on religious issues. This is one of the reasons why such issues are often excluded from the public realm. Of course, religion may still be addressed in legal or political terms or from the perspective of the social sciences. But in all these cases, public dialogue is *about* religion, but it certainly is not a *religious* dialogue expressive of different faiths.

In my understanding, this situation is detrimental in several respects. First, it is detrimental in that a whole dimension of human life—the religious dimension of the life cycle—is not given full access to human communication. Second, it is detrimental to society in that there is no meaningful public exchange on matters of ultimate meaning. And third, it is detrimental for the church in that any public communication on faith and religion becomes more difficult, even in the limited public of a particular church. Consequently, a theology of the life cycle must include the task of designing models for religious communication—models that work within the church but that are also viable for a wider public.

Why must such models be designed in the context of the life cycle? In my understanding, there are at least two important reasons for this need. The first reason refers to the educational and developmental prerequisites for religious communication. This kind of communication presupposes certain abilities, such as knowing the appropriate language, being able to express and to explain one's own faith in such a way that others who do not share it can make sense of it, taking the perspective of the other, and so forth. Such abilities must be developed and acquired at appropriate times in life, which is why a theology of the life cycle should inform us about the dialogical or communicative learning tasks related to the respective stages of the life cycle.

The second reason for including the perspective of religious communication within a theology of the life cycle has once more to do with the challenges of postmodernity. To the degree that the postmodern pluralization leads to religious individualism and privatism, theology and the church must have a strong interest in overcoming such tendencies. The Christian faith, by its very nature, cannot be reduced to an individualistic and private matter. It refers to, and it deeply respects, every individual person in his or her own right. But it can only do so by claiming a public role in society. To develop a theology of the life cycle does not mean that theology should only be attentive to individual or personal concerns. Rather, such a theology is itself of public concern and importance, especially for the inhabitants of postmodernity.

Faith, Christian ethics, and religious communication indicate three directions in which the task of developing a theology of the life cycle should be pursued in more detail. And it is also clear that what we need is a theology of the postmodern life cycle, a theology for our contemporary situation. This theology must be able to look in two directions—in the direction of postmodern life and its demands on theology and the church, but also in the direction of Christian theology and its demands on postmodern life.

Challenges of Postmodern Life (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996); see also Jack L. Seymour et al., *The Church in the Education of the Public: Refocusing the Task of Religious Education* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1984).

Chapter 6: Between Adulthood and Old Age

[1] Erik H. Erikson must be honored for one the earliest ventures into this field of adult developmental psychology; see his *Childhood and Society*, 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 1950), esp. the seminal chapter on the "Eight Ages of Man."

[2] One of the clearest examples still is James W. Fowler, *Stages of Faith: The Psychology of Human Development and the Quest for Meaning* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981).

[3] See my books: Friedrich Schweitzer, *Lebensgeschichte und Religion. Religiöse Entwicklung und Erziehung im Kindes- und Jugendalter* (Munich: Kaiser, 1987); idem, *Die Religion des Kindes. Zur Problemgeschichte einer religionspädagogischen Grundfrage* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1992); idem, *Die Suche nach eigenem Glauben. Einführung in die Religionspädagogik des Jugendalters* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1996); Wolfgang Lück and Friedrich Schweitzer, *Religiöse Bildung Erwachsener. Grundlagen und Impulse für die Praxis* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1999).

[4] Peter Laslett, *A Fresh Map of Life: The Emergence of the Third Age* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989).

[5] See the discussions in Martina Blasberg-Kuhnke, *Gerontologie und Praktische Theologie. Studien zu einer Neuorientierung der Altenpastoral an der psychischen und gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit des alten Menschen* (Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1985); K. Brynolf Lyon, *Toward a Practical Theology of Aging* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985); Melvin A. Kimble et al., eds., *Aging, Spirituality, and Religion: A Handbook* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995).

[6] This concern is as widespread in the political discussions as in the academic literature; for a recent statement, see Beverly Goldberg, *Age Works: What Corporate America Must Do to Survive the Graying of the Workforce* (New York: The Free Press, 2000).

[7] For a summary, see Laslett, *Fresh Map*; Paul Johnson and Pat Thane, eds., *Old Age from Antiquity to Post-Modernity* (London: Routledge, 1998).

[8] Erik H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society*, 2d ed. (New York: Norton, 1963), 268.

[9] Ibid.

[10] See Johnson and Thane, *Old Age*; Peter Borscheid, "Der alte Mensch in der Vergangenheit," in *Alter und Altern: Ein interdisziplinärer Studientext zur Gerontologie,* ed. Paul B. Baltes et al. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1994), 35–61.

[11] See Gerald J. Gruman, "Cultural Origins of Present-Day 'Age-ism': The Modernization of the Life Cycle," in *Aging and the Elderly: Humanistic Perspectives in Gerontology,* ed. Stuart F. Spicker et al. (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1978), 359–87.

[12] See Laslett, *Fresh Map*; Baltes et al., *Alter und Altern;* Johnson and Thane, *Old Age*.

[13] Goldberg, *Age Works*.

[14] See Laslett, *Fresh Map,* 65.

[15] Erikson, *Childhood and Society,* 2d ed., 268.

[16] Erik H. Erikson, *Identity, Youth, and Crisis* (New York: Norton, 1968), 140.

[17] Erikson, *Identity,* 141.

[18] See Wade Clark Roof and William McKinney, *American Mainline Religion: Its Changing Shape and Future* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1987); for examples from Germany, see Joachim Matthes, ed., *Kirchenmitgliedschaft im Wandel: Untersuchungen zur Realität der Volkskirche. Beiträge zur zweiten EKD-Umfrage "Was wird aus der Kirche?"* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1990).

[19] See Blasberg-Kuhnke, *Gerontologie und Praktische Theologie;* Lyon, *Practical Theology of Aging.*

[20] See the discussion by Blasberg-Kuhnke, *Gerontologie und Praktische Theologie.*

[21] For a good overview, see Deutsches Jugendinstitut, ed., *Wie geht's der Familie? Ein Handbuch zur Situation der Familien heute* (Munich: Kösel, 1988).

[22] Laslett, *Fresh Map,* 4.

[23] See Karl Ulrich Mayer and Paul B. Baltes, eds., *Die Berliner Altersstudie* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1999); see also Baltes and Mittelstraß, op. cit.

[24] See the overviews in the following: Kimble et al., eds., *Aging, Spirituality, and Religion*; Harold G. Koenig, *Aging and God: Spiritual Pathways to Mental Health in Midlife and Later Years* (New York: Harworth Pastoral Press, 1994); Marianne Habersetzer, *Leben und Glauben–ein katechetischer Weg mit älteren Menschen* (Würzburg: Echter, 1998); Ulrich Moser, *Identität, Spiritualität und Lebenssinn. Grundlagen seelsorgerlicher Begleitung im Altenheim* (Würzburg: Echter, 2000).

[25] See the beginning of this chapter.

[26] Koenig, *Aging and God.*

[27] Koenig, *Aging and God,* 284–94.

[28] See statements earlier in this chapter from the works of Martina Blasberg-Kuhnke (notes 5 and 20).

[29] See Alfons Auer, *Geglücktes Altern. Eine theologisch-ethische Ermutigung* (Freiburg: Herder, 1995), 109.

[30] Daniel Levinson, *The Seasons of a Man's Life* (New York: Knopf, 1978), 97.

[31] The now classic study is Philippe Ariès, *Western Attitudes Toward Death: From the Middle Ages to the Present* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1975); see also Joachim Wittkowski, *Psychologie des Todes* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1990).

[32] Elisabeth Kübler-Ross, *On Death and Dying* (New York: Macmillan, 1969).

Chapter 7: Theological Demands on Postmodern Life

[1] The major exception in Germany is Albrecht Grözinger, *Die Kirche–ist sie noch zu retten? Anstiftungen für das Christentum in postmoderner Gesellschaft* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1998); for an overview on the German literature, see Wolfgang Steck, *Praktische Theologie. Horizonte der Religion, Konturen des neuzeitlichen Christentums, Strukturen der religiösen Lebenswelt,* vol. 1 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2000), 209ff.

[2] See Walter Brueggemann, *Texts under Negotation: The Bible and Postmodern Imagination* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993); or the collections: David Ray Griffin, William A. Beardslee, and Joe Holland, *Varieties of Postmodern Theology* (Albany, N.Y.: State Univ. of New York Press, 1989); Terrence W. Tilley, ed., *Postmodern Theologies: The Challenge of Religious Diversity* (New York: Maryknoll, 1995). To mention a few additional examples from Germany: Bernd Beuscher, *Positives Paradox. Entwurf einer neostrukturalistischen Religionspädagogik* (Vienna: Passagen, 1993); Hermann Kochanek, ed., *Religion und Glaube in der Postmoderne* (Nettetal: Steyler, 1996).

[3] David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989); Wolfgang Welsch, *Unsere postmoderne Moderne* (Weinheim: VCH, 1988).

[4] Werner Helsper, "Das 'postmoderne Selbst'–ein neuer Subjekt-und Jugendmythos? Reflexionen anhand religiöser jugendlicher Orientierungen," in *Identitätsarbeit heute. Klassische und aktuelle Perspektiven der Identitätsforschung,* ed. Heiner Keupp and Renate Höfer (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997), 174–206.

[5] See my earlier books: Friedrich Schweitzer, *Lebensgeschichte und Religion. Religiöse Entwicklung und Erziehung im Kindes- und Jugendalter* (Munich: Kaiser, 1987); idem, *Die Suche nach eigenem Glauben. Einführung in die Religionspädagogik des Jugendalters* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1996); idem, *Das Recht des Kindes auf Religion* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2000).

[6] Donald Capps, *Pastoral Care: A Thematic Approach* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1979); John J. Gleason, *Growing Up to God: Eight Steps in Religious Development* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1975); Joachim Scharfenberg, *Einführung in die Pastoralpsychologie* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985).

[7] For a discussion, see Wilhelm Gräb, *Lebensgeschichten, Lebensentwürfe, Sinndeutungen. Eine Praktische Theologie gelebter Religion* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1998).

[8]Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash, *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1994).

[9]Schleiermacher's clearest statement on modernity can be found in his *On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers* (New York: Harper & Row, 1958, orig. pub. 1799). For his view of practical theology, see idem, *Brief Outline on the Study of Theology*, trans. Terrence N. Tice (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1966).

[10]For this understanding, see Volker Drehsen, *Neuzeitliche Konstitutionsbedingungen der Praktischen Theologie. Aspekte der theologischen Wende zur sozialkulturellen Lebenswelt christlicher Religion.* 2 vols. (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1988); for the contemporary discussion, see Friedrich Schweitzer and Johannes A. van der Ven, eds., *Practical Theology–International Perspectives* (Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 1999).

[11]See the literature on postmodernity: Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity;* Welsch, *Unsere postmoderne Moderne;* Beck, Giddens, and Lash, *Reflexive Modernization.*

[12]For a more detailed discussion of these different forms of religion, see Dietrich Rössler, *Grundriß der Praktischen Theologie* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1986).

[13]See José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1994).

[14]For further background information, see Schweitzer and van der Ven. eds., *Practical Theology;* Don S. Browning, ed., *Practical Theology* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1983); idem, *A Fundamental Practical Theology: Descriptive and Strategy Proposals* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991).

[15]Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1966).

[16]For an example from the older literature, see Romano Guardini, *Die Lebensalter. Ihre ethische und pädagogische Bedeutung* (Würzburg: Werkbund-Verlag, no year of publication, approx. 1955).

[17]Many of them have been quoted in the chapters above.

[18]James E. Loder, *The Logic of the Spirit: Human Development in Theological Perspective* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1998).

[19]The chart is taken from my book, Friederich Schweitzer, *Lebensgeschichte und Religion. Religiöse Entwicklung und Erziehung im Kindes- und Jugendalter*, enlarged ed. (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1999), 202. It is based on the earlier correlational efforts by Gleason, *Growing Up to God;* Joachim Scharfenberg, "Menschliche Reifung und christliche Symbole," in *Concilium* 14 (1978): 86–92; Donald Capps, *Pastoral Care,* 114; Heinz Müller-Pozzi, "Gott–Erbe des verlorenen Pardieses. Ursprung und Wesen der Gottesidee im Lichte psychoanalytischer Konzepte," in *Wege zum Menschen* 33 (1981): 190–203; J. Eugene Wright, *Erikson: Identity and Religion* (New York: Seabury Press, 1982), 160; Hans-Jürgen Fraas, *Glaube und Identität. Grundlegung einer Didaktik religiöser Lernprozesse* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1983), 107ff.; Peter Biehl, "Symbol und Metapher auf dem Weg zu einer religionspädagogischen Theorie religiöser Sprache," in *Jahrbuch der Religionspädagogik* 1 (1985): 54ff.

[20]Erik H. Erikson, *Insight and Responsibility: Lectures on the Ethical Implications of Psychoanalytic Insight* (New York: Norton, 1964), 111–34.

[21]Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1982).