

Overview of Migration Trends in Europe and Central Asia, 1990–2004

Some of the trends and motivations for migration in the Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region are similar to those found elsewhere in the world. However, many of the migration movements that have taken place since 1990 are unique to the region, given the circumstances of economic transition, political and social liberalization, and the breakup of three federal states. Figure 1.1 shows how the factors influencing migration have changed from the communist period to the present. This chapter provides an overview of some of the main migration trends that have taken place across the region over the past 15 years, with a focus on international movements among countries.

Migration in the ECA region is both large by international standards and unique in that the region is both a major receiver and sender of migrants. Figure 1.2 exhibits the ECA region and selected ECA countries in terms of their shares of foreign-born populations. Excluding movements between industrial countries, ECA accounts for over one-third of world emigration and immigration. There are 35 million foreign-born residents in ECA countries, including 13 million in the Russian Federation, 7 million in Ukraine, 3 million in Kazakhstan, 3 million in Poland, and 1.5 million in Turkey. Furthermore, several ECA countries are among the top 10 sending and receiving countries of migrants worldwide. Russia is home to the second largest number of migrants in the world after the United States; Ukraine is

FIGURE 1.1

Transition of the Migration System in the Europe and Central Asia Region

Migration under Central Planning in the Europe and Central Asia Region	Migration during the Transition Period in the Europe and Central Asia Region
Eight countries in the region (only five remain in their pretransition borders)	Twenty-seven countries following the breakup of three federal states
Migration was very tightly controlled	Much less control over migration
Prices were administratively set and wages and income were not very differentiated across sectors or regions	Prices are market determined and income is increasingly distributed among people, sectors, and regions
A massive and elaborate system of subsidies caused certain sectors and regions to be "over-valued" and others to be "under-valued"	Wages and prices have adjusted to their market-clearing value
Migration control efforts were aimed mainly at keeping people in a country	Migration control is aimed at both keeping people in and outside a country and, in general, migration control systems are poorly developed
Little involvement in international institutions and foreign trade	Open economies, involvement with international institutions, and "globalization"

Source: World Bank staff.

fourth after Germany; and Kazakhstan and Poland are respectively ninth and tenth.


Migration patterns in the region follow a broad biaxial pattern: on one axis a migration system developed among the countries of Western, Central, and Eastern Europe and on the other a system of movement arose among the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). However, this system is not exclusively bipolar. Though the majority of migrants from Central and Eastern European countries move into Western Europe, the same is true for many migrants from the poorer CIS economies, particularly Moldova. While the majority of migrants from Central Asia travel to the resource-rich CIS countries (particularly Russia and Kazakhstan) many move west in search of higher earnings, toward the European Union (EU) and Turkey.

The creation of many new countries following the breakup of the Soviet Union produced "new" migrants (long-term, foreign-born residents) who may not have physically moved, but were defined as migrants under UN practice. In addition to the issue of these "statistical" migrants, there are numerous other problems in analyzing migration trends across the region based on available data. This chapter and the report in general are an attempt to pull together and analyze all available migration data to gain as complete a picture as possible of migration trends over the past 15 years; thus, the issue of the veracity of migration data is a constant theme.

The chapter begins with a description of some of the problems involved in measuring migration among the ECA countries during

FIGURE 1.2

Migration in Top 10 Sending and Receiving Countries and by Region, 2003



Sources: UN Population Division 2003 and Walmsley, Ahmed, and Parsons 2005.

the transition period. Then using the data that are available, it analyzes the impact of migration on overall levels of population change in the ECA countries. The next section provides a broad overview of migration flows across the ECA region during the period 2000–03, a recent period when most of the ethnic migration had already taken place and flows were dominated by the economic migration flows that are expected to predominate in the future. Following this are discussions of refugee and internally displaced population movements, and transit and irregular migration. A further section looks at the main migration partners of each ECA country. Finally, the chapter looks at possible future migration trends in the region.¹

Problems with Measuring Migration in ECA

There are three main sources for migration data in the ECA countries, as well as in countries outside the region. These are population censuses, usually conducted once a decade; administrative statistics of persons crossing international borders; and surveys. This final category includes surveys targeted directly at migrant populations, as well as surveys designed for other purposes where migration-related questions are asked.

Population censuses usually include questions that measure lifetime migration. For instance, the last Soviet census, conducted in January 1989, included questions on place of birth, whether the respondent had been living in his or her present residence continuously since birth, and if not, when he or she had migrated to that place. All of the ECA countries conducted population censuses between the years 1989 and 1992 and most conducted another census between 1999 and 2002. The more recent round of censuses typically included a question on citizenship, though this question was frequently not posed in the censuses conducted around 1990. Some also included questions about persons temporarily absent. The 2002 Russian census also included a set of questions for those persons temporarily residing in Russia, although the total of a quarter million persons enumerated were thought to significantly underestimate the true figure.

Whereas censuses attempt to count stocks of migrants, administrative statistics are counts of flows of migrants. In most cases, data on total international border crossings also record information on the age, sex, and country of previous residence or intended destination, and other characteristics of migrants. It is the change, and in some cases breakdown, of systems for measuring migration flows where the ECA countries have suffered the most.

Surveys are useful for obtaining qualitative information about migrants and to serve as a check on the veracity of flow statistics from administrative sources. An increasing number of surveys of migrants have been conducted across the ECA region, both by the countries themselves as well as by international organizations such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

Several reasons make migration flows in ECA challenging to capture. First, the type, direction, and magnitude of the flows in the region have changed dramatically since the beginning of economic transition, liberalization of societies (including increased freedom of movement), and the emergence of 22 new states. What had previously been internal boundaries have now become international borders. Migration in ECA, which was once subject to considerable state control within several self-contained migration spaces, now rests in the hands of individuals who have the ability to transit across new and rather porous international boundaries. In the former Soviet Union, the propiska or resident permit system required persons to register before being allowed to migrate to a new location. However, the visa-free travel among the CIS countries for most of the 1990s contributed to an environment of porous borders, which made the recording of migration flows difficult. The extent to which the successor states have instituted systems to properly measure total migration flows and to disaggregate these flows by age, gender, nationality, and other characteristics useful for analysis and policy making varies considerably.

The previous systems for measuring migration in the centrally planned countries of the ECA are wholly inadequate for capturing movements across the newly independent states. In their initial years, the newly independent states had to erect the elements of government apparatus, including independent statistical systems to measure social and economic trends such as migration movements. With other elements of state building causing greater concern, building systems for measuring migration often received low priority. Many of these issues in migration measurement are unique to the newly independent states of the ECA region.

A second set of problems with proper migration measurement is endemic to all countries. Definitions, underlying concepts, sources, and reporting systems differ significantly between countries, making available migration statistics fragmentary. The boundaries between extended travel, seasonal work, and economic migration are blurred. In most cases it is not clear whether an individual reported as “migrant” is a long-term mover, a temporary mover, a seasonal worker, someone on the move to another destination, an individual transitioning through a territory, a returning migrant, a member of a

family already residing abroad with no intention to work, a student (who may or may not undertake part-time employment), a refugee, a member of the staff of a foreign company in the country, or some other category of migrant.

Third, undocumented migration plays an important role in today's migrant flows to, from, and within ECA, as well as in many other parts of the world. Reported data refers to legal migrants, based most often on residence or work permits. Even countries in the region with seemingly well-developed statistical systems often are not able to record migration completely. Decennial population censuses are used to adjust and calibrate population totals. For instance, in Lithuania, there was a downward adjustment of the population by over 200,000, or more than 5 percent of the population, following the census conducted there in April 2001. Roughly the same magnitude of adjustment took place in Estonia following its March 2000 census, when it adjusted the population total downward by 67,000, or about 5 percent. Similar post-census adjustments downsizing the resident population were made in the Czech Republic, Poland, and the Slovak Republic. Among the surprises in the Russian census conducted in October 2002 was that the total population was 1.2 million higher than the previous estimate, mainly because of an undercount of migration.

These differences between population estimates and census figures in the ECA countries are worth comparing to the experience of the United States, long a traditional migration destination. Before the 2000 census in the United States, the population was estimated at 275 million. That census revealed a count of 281 million, a difference of 6 million, almost all attributable to an undercount of the huge migration into the United States during the 1990s.² The United States has long grappled with an issue that the ECA states are only beginning to deal with in trying to estimate temporary or circular migration. Until recently, most of the ECA states recorded only long-term or permanent moves and much of the movements over the past decade are of a temporary or circular nature.

The breakup of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia created a large number of "statistical migrants." The commonly accepted UN definition describes a "migrant" as a person living outside his or her country of birth. As used here, statistical migrants refers to persons who migrated internally while those countries existed, thus not qualifying as a migrant under the UN definition at the time, but who began to be counted as migrants when those countries broke apart even though they did not move again. Having a large number of these statistical migrants has hampered analysis of migration patterns across the ECA region because of the difficulty of separ-

rating those who moved during the communist period, before the start of transition and independence, and those who moved later for ethnic or economic reasons. However, with data that are available from population censuses, it is possible to get a fairly good idea of the total number of statistical migrants and changes in their numbers since the breakup of the countries.

Table 1.1 shows the population of the Soviet Union by place of birth in 1989, at the time of the last Soviet census. At that time, 2.4 million persons or 0.8 percent of the population had been born outside the Soviet Union.³ This low figure is not surprising because for most of the period between the end of World War II and the breakup of the Soviet Union, there was little migration either into or out of the Soviet Union and little shifting of international borders. In fact, the listed figure of the Soviet population being classified as migrants is likely a considerable overestimate because it also includes those not indicating their place of birth. If similar data from the 2002 Russian census is any guide, about one-quarter had actually been born outside the former Soviet Union and about three-quarters did not indicate their place of birth. Thus, the true figure of the migrant population was likely less than 1 million or only about 0.3 percent of the population.

TABLE 1.1
Population by Place of Birth in the USSR, 1989
(thousands)

Place of permanent residence	Born in republic of current residence	Born elsewhere in USSR	Born outside USSR	Total population	Born in republic of current residence	Born elsewhere in USSR	Born outside USSR
USSR	255,409	27,955	2,378	100.0	89.4	9.8	0.8
RSFSR	135,550	10,478	994	100.0	92.2	7.1	0.7
Ukrainskaia SSR	44,332	6,665	455	100.0	86.2	13.0	0.9
Belorusskaia SSR	8,883	1,213	55	100.0	87.5	12.0	0.5
Uzbekskaia SSR	18,108	1,649	53	100.0	91.4	8.3	0.3
Kazahskaia SSR	12,715	3,536	214	100.0	77.2	21.5	1.3
Gruzinskaia SSR	5,039	349	13	100.0	93.3	6.5	0.2
Azerbaidzhanskaia SSR	6,604	398	19	100.0	94.1	5.7	0.3
Litovskaia SSR	3,299	356	19	100.0	89.8	9.7	0.5
Moldavskaia SSR	3,739	579	18	100.0	86.2	13.3	0.4
Latviiskaia SSR	1,975	678	14	100.0	74.0	25.4	0.5
Kirgizskaia SSR	3,586	638	34	100.0	84.2	15.0	0.8
Tadzhikskaia SSR	4,650	433	9	100.0	91.3	8.5	0.2
Armianskaia SSR	2,570	267	467	100.0	77.8	8.1	14.1
Turkmenskaia SSR	3,205	311	7	100.0	91.0	8.8	0.2
Estonskaia SSR	1,155	403	8	100.0	73.7	25.7	0.5

Source: Eastview Publications and CIS Statistical Committee; USSR Census Results 1989 CD-ROM.

Note: Data are as of January 1989.

However, there was considerable migration among the states of the former Soviet Union. In 1989, there were 28 million persons who were residing in a republic other than the one in which they were born. This figure amounted to 9.8 percent of the Soviet population, which should be regarded as the number of “statistical migrants” that were created by the breakup of the Soviet Union, greatly contributing to the increase in the world stock of migrants. The bulk of these individuals were in the three Slavic states, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. In percentage terms, the countries with the largest migrant stock populations were Estonia, Latvia, and Kazakhstan. All of these countries were prime destinations for Russian and Russian-speaking migrants during the period after World War II.


Migration and Population Change

An analysis of migration and population change among the ECA states begins at a broad level by dividing the countries into groups according to their recent patterns of migration and natural increase in population (figure 1.3; data underlying this figure are in appendix 2). Natural increase is the difference between the number of births and deaths and is a function of the age structure of the population and levels of fertility and mortality. As will be discussed below, differential rates of natural increase among countries are a major driver of migration within the ECA region and elsewhere. A positive natural increase occurs where the number of births exceeds the number of deaths, which is the situation in nearly all countries in the world. Negative natural increase is where the number of deaths in a population exceeds the number of births. The 14 ECA countries shown below with a negative natural increase or a natural decrease, along with Italy and Germany, are among a small group of countries where this is occurring. So many ECA countries are part of this group because fertility levels have fallen steeply during the transition period, to 1.3 children per woman or less; such levels are unsustainable for natural population increase.⁴ These figures are compared to net migration, which is the difference between the number of immigrants to a country and emigrants from a country.

There are two countries in the ECA region that have both a natural increase and positive net migration; however, neither truly belongs in this category because both suffer from data problems that affect their migration counts. Turkmenistan has some rather unrealistically high population estimates, which cause net migration figures to appear unrealistically high. Bosnia and Herzegovina suffers from

FIGURE 1.3

Natural Increase (Decrease) and Net Migration in the ECA Region, 2000–03



Source: National statistical office of the ECA countries and UNICEF, TransMONEE Database.

incomplete and inconsistent counts of migration, with some years showing emigration and some immigration. Furthermore, in recent years, there has been an undetermined amount of return migration of some of the refugee populations that left during the mid-1990s. Based on this evidence, both of these countries should probably be grouped in the category of countries with positive natural increase and negative net migration.

There are 10 ECA countries that combine natural increase and net emigration (12 if the two mentioned above are included). This is the pattern for most of the world’s countries. This includes the countries of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and many of the former Yugoslav states. With their faster-growing populations, especially youth populations, migration pressures in these countries will likely persist into the future.

A third group of countries comprises those that combine having more deaths than births and more immigrants than emigrants. These are Russia and Belarus in the CIS and four of the smaller new EU member states. While all have had more immigrants than emigrants over recent years, in all but Russia, the population increases as a result

of net migration are small, amounting to less than 1 percent of their populations. As pointed out elsewhere in this report, Russia has become a major migration magnet within the CIS, with a measured population increase from migration of 4 percent since 1990 and perhaps an equal amount of undocumented migration.

A fourth group are nine ECA countries where populations are declining because they experience both more deaths than births and more emigrants than immigrants. This includes Ukraine and Moldova, the three Baltic states, and four Central European countries, including the largest, Poland. In all of these countries, both trends are expected to continue well into the future, causing large population declines as well as rapid aging of their populations.

Figures 1.4a and 1.4b show the net population change from migration over the period 1989–2003 for the CIS and western ECA countries, respectively.⁵ From this figure, one part of the region's bipolar migration story of the past decade and a half can be clearly seen, with Russia showing by far the largest population gain from migration. The impact on those other few countries with population gains from migration has been minimal. Most of the migrants into Russia consist of persons migrating from the other states of the former Soviet Union, which show large population declines from migration. There have been several countries in the region that have transitioned from net emigration to net immigration including Belarus, Slovenia, Hungary, Croatia, and Serbia and Montenegro.

Of the five ECA countries with population declines of over 15 percent, four are in the southern tier of the former Soviet Union. The three Baltic states have had considerable out-migration in large part because of the emigration of large numbers of Russians and Russian-speakers in the years immediately following the breakup of the Soviet Union. In southeast Europe, Albania and Bulgaria have also had emigrations of large portions of their populations.

These figures are based on counts of the long-term, permanent migration of the populations and do not include short-term or undocumented counts of population movements. These figures also understate the potential impact of migration because it is usually the better-educated segments of the population and those in the early stages of their working lives who migrate in the largest numbers.

Major Migration Flows in the ECA Region

As mentioned often throughout this report, proper measurement of migration is difficult, even for high-income countries with well-devel-

FIGURE 1.4
Net Migration in Western ECA and the CIS



Source: National statistical offices and UNICEF, TransMONEE Database.

oped statistical systems. For the ECA countries, measuring migration during this period of rapid social, economic, and political change has been especially difficult. However, by compiling migration data from several different sources and triangulating, a fairly complete picture of the major flows taking place within the region can be obtained. It

is helpful to keep in mind that international migration involves a flow between two countries and that when a person migrates, that person ideally should be recorded twice, by both the sending and receiving country. Even so, there is considerable variation in how countries record migrants; some countries track movements of people by place of previous or next residence, some by citizenship, and some by various other methods.

Table 1.2 shows the migration flows among major blocs of ECA countries and origins and destinations of flows outside the region for the years 2000 to 2003. This was a period after much of the ethnic-induced migration associated with the breakup of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia had already taken place and the magnitude of migration flows had settled into a more “normal” pattern influenced primarily by economic incentives. The table was compiled by collecting all available data on migration by origin and destination country according to both residence and citizenship definitions; this was followed by calculating a “maximum” matrix of the highest of each pair of flows. Migration data for 52 countries were collected, comprising the 28 ECA countries, 21 countries in Western Europe, plus Canada, Israel, and the United States. Sufficient data were available to fill about 90 percent of the matrix. Most of the cells that were not able to be filled represented flows between pairs of countries for which there is not known to be substantial migration (for example, between Iceland and Turkmenistan). Thus, the assembled data are thought to be a fairly complete representation of migration involving ECA countries during this period.

The data partially support the story that two major migration blocs have developed involving migration of the ECA countries. As suspected by other and anecdotal evidence, there has been considerable migration from western ECA to Western Europe and considerable migration from the rest of the CIS into Russia. At the same time, there are other flows developing that were not suspected and not that readily apparent from other data. About equal percentages of migrants from the CIS countries other than Russia (other CIS) travel to Russia as to Western Europe, with Ukraine and Kazakhstan being the major sending countries and Germany the major receiver. Over 70 percent of migrants from western ECA go to Western Europe. At the same time, there is also considerable flow from Western Europe to western ECA. Flows between Germany and three countries make up the bulk of this overall total, that is, flows from Germany to Poland, Serbia and Montenegro, and Turkey. These figures not only represent the return of persons who had previously migrated but also indicate considerable “churning,” as for each of these three flows, there are also large flows in the opposite direction.

TABLE 1.2
Migration Flows Involving ECA Countries, 2000–03

TABLE 1.2A
Total Migration Flows Involving ECA Countries and Major Partners, 2000–03

From	To					
	Russia	Other CIS	Western ECA	Western Europe	U.S., Canada, Israel	Total (emigration)
Russia	0	272,929	17,882	85,468	53,539	429,818
Other CIS	319,514	159,652	85,104	280,843	90,265	935,378
Western ECA	22,896	32,820	274,762	1,300,289	149,045	1,779,812
Western Europe	74,460	82,705	640,052	2,808,366	269,253	3,874,837
U.S., Canada, Israel	8,466	6,342	16,973	457,664	142,762	632,207
Total (immigration)	425,336	554,448	1,034,773	4,932,630	704,864	

TABLE 1.2B
Percent of Total Emigration

From	To					
	Russia	Other CIS	Western ECA	Western Europe	U.S., Canada, Israel	Total (emigration)
Russia	0	63	4	20	12	100
Other CIS	34	17	9	30	10	100
Western ECA	1	2	15	73	8	100
Western Europe	2	2	17	72	7	100
U.S., Canada, Israel	1	1	3	72	23	100

TABLE 1.2C
Percent of Total Immigration

From	To					
	Russia	Other CIS	Western ECA	Western Europe	U.S., Canada, Israel	
Russia	0	49	2	2	8	
Other CIS	75	29	8	6	13	
Western ECA	5	6	27	26	21	
Western Europe	18	15	62	57	38	
U.S., Canada, Israel	2	1	2	9	20	
Total (immigration)	100	100	100	100	100	

Source: See text for explanation of how data were compiled.

Note: "Other CIS" consists of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. "Western ECA" consists of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, FYR Macedonia, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Turkey. "Western Europe" consists of Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.


On the immigration side, Russia receives 75 percent of its immigrants from other CIS countries. There are minimal flows from the CIS states in the western ECA, with over half consisting of migrants from Ukraine to the Czech Republic and from Moldova into Romania; Ukraine and Moldova are thus unique in having significant migrant

flows both to Western Europe and to resource-rich CIS countries. The largest flows into Western Europe are from other Western European countries, making up about half of the total. However, flows into Western Europe from western ECA make up about one-third of the total.

Figure 1.5 shows the largest country-to-country migration streams involving a CIS country for the period 2000–03. Much of this is driven by the gravity of proximity and population size; thus, it is not surprising that Russia is either a source or destination of most of these flows. The largest flows that do not include Russia are flows from Kazakhstan to Germany and Ukraine to Germany. The flow from Ukraine to Germany can be explained by proximity, population size, and large differences in per capita income, while the flow from Kazakhstan to Germany can be explained by the fact that Kazakhstan was home to the largest concentration of Germans in the former Soviet Union and, initially, Germany had a rather liberal law for the return of the *Aussiedler*. The pull of Russia from the other CIS countries is clearly evident from the map.


Figure 1.6 shows the largest country-to-country migration streams involving a western ECA country for the same period. A quite different pattern emerges than among CIS states, with a country outside

FIGURE 1.5
Largest Migration Flows Involving a CIS Country, 2000–03



Source: World Bank staff estimates based on analysis of migration statistics from a variety of sending and receiving countries.

FIGURE 1.6
Largest Migration Flows Involving a Western ECA Country, 2000–03



Source: World Bank staff estimates based on analysis of migration statistics from a variety of sending and receiving countries.

the region, Germany, being the major driver of migration for these countries. Again the gravity of migration encompassing proximity, population size, and the size of the German economy explains many of the notable patterns. None of the largest flows involved two countries within the region because there are only two countries, Turkey and Poland, that can be considered sizable (or at least medium-sized comparable to the largest Western European countries). What is interesting is that all of the largest flows involving Germany are two-way flows with large amounts of return migration.

Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

Each of the ECA countries is an ethnic homeland. However, many other ethnic homelands exist at the subnational level. The boundaries of many of these were drawn arbitrarily by outside authorities and do not necessarily coincide with what different ethnic groups regard as their rightful homelands. During the communist period, there was considerable migration of different ethnic groups to regions or countries outside of their homelands. When Yugoslavia and the Soviet

Union broke apart, they did so along their ethnic seams. Most of this occurred peacefully but was accompanied by some diaspora migration. However, in some cases these cleavages instigated considerable ethnoterritorial conflict; as a result, forced migration became the predominant form of migration in some parts of the region. Figure 1.7 shows the major displacements that took place in the former Yugoslavia in 1995 at about the peak of the conflict there. Figure 1.8 shows the same for the former Soviet Union for the mid-1990s.

Figure 1.9 shows the temporal trends in the numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) across the ECA region between 1989 and 2003.⁶ The figure shows a combination of actual and statistical trends. During the late communist period, the numbers of refugees and IDPs were rather small. However, estimates rely on imperfect data counting measures; none of these countries had acceded to the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees and hence did not have mechanisms in place for recognizing and counting refugees. As the newly independent states in the region and others began to erect institutions capable of enumerating refugees and asylum seekers, their numbers began to increase. Thus, part of the rise from 1989 to the mid-1990s is statistical. However, a large part of the increase is real, brought about by the increase in the number of persons dis-


FIGURE 1.7
Main Displaced Populations from the Former Yugoslavia, December 1995



Source: Humanitarian Issues Working Group HIWG06/6, December 11, 1996.

FIGURE 1.8

Main Displaced Population from the Former Soviet Union, Mid–1990s




Source: Based on IOM, CIS Migration Report 1996.

Note: Map is designed to broadly illustrate major refugee and IDP flows at the time, based upon best available information, and is not intended to be authoritative or precise.

FIGURE 1.9

Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in the ECA Region, 1989–2003



Source: UNICEF, TransMONEE database.


placed as a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and the resultant ethnoterritorial disputes.

The number of refugees increased from 145,000 in 1989 to over a half million during the years 1992 to 1997 (with the exception of 1994), but fell to about 237,000 in 2003. It should be kept in mind that these figures refer to the numbers of refugees and IDPs *within* each of the ECA countries, *not* from the countries. Refugees, by definition, have crossed an international border, whereas IDPs have not. If the number of refugees *from* the ECA countries were counted instead, the number would certainly be higher because many of those from the former Yugoslav states fled to Western Europe. Partly for these reasons, the number of IDPs is comparatively much higher than for the number of refugees, rising from about 100,000 in 1989 to over a million during the years 1993 to 1997 before declining slightly to 927,000 in 2003. In 2003, the largest concentrations of IDPs were in Azerbaijan (576,000) and Georgia (262,000). These numbers are down only slightly from peaks in the mid-1990s because the conflicts that gave rise to them continue to persist without any permanent settlement.

Figure 1.10 shows the countries in the ECA region with the largest concentrations of refugees, IDPs, and “others of concern” at the end of 2004, according to the UNHCR. Overall, the ECA region accounts for 7.4 percent of the world population in total but contains 19 percent of

FIGURE 1.10

Largest Numbers of Refugees, IDPs, and Others of Concern in the ECA Region, 2004



Source: UNHCR, 2004 Global Refugee Trends (<http://www.unhcr.org>).

the total number of asylum seekers, refugees, and others of concern. In particular, the ECA region accounts for a disproportionate share of the world's total number of IDPs (32 percent), because of past or ongoing conflicts in Russia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan in the CIS, and in Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the former Yugoslavia. Substantial proportions of ECA migrants also fall into the category of "others of concern," which generally includes asylum seekers, returned refugees, returned IDPs, and various other categories of (usually forced) migrants. In ECA countries, this includes various categories of stateless persons and, in Latvia and Estonia, the large Russian-speaking groups of noncitizens. Aside from those two countries, the ECA countries with the largest numbers of persons of concern are mostly those where there has been or continues to be conflict. The region also accounts for a disproportionate share of others of concern because of the large number of stateless or noncitizens living in various countries. Many of the original ethnoterritorial conflicts that gave rise to these groups of forced migrants remain unresolved more than a decade after they first arose.

Transit and Undocumented Migration in the ECA Region

With the opening up of the ECA countries to the rest of the world and the liberalization of migration, transit, illegal, and undocumented migration has become an issue for countries in the region, and particularly for those that were not previously under communist rule. Some migrants (from within and outside ECA) hoping to migrate to the United States, Japan, or Western Europe seek transit through ECA countries. Some transit migrants then conclude that this hope is unrealistic and settle in the transit country, which typically is poorer than the West but more developed than their home country. Russia is emerging as a transit as well as a key sending and receiving country. Ukraine, Romania, and Azerbaijan are examples of other countries in the ECA region that have significant transit migrant populations. This section first considers the motivations of migrants who come to the ECA. It then considers the experience of the host countries from two perspectives: the statistical frequency of undocumented migration (a figure notably difficult to calculate), and the policy decisions of ECA states for regulating this phenomenon.

Migration Experiences

The decision to migrate, as well as the choice of destination, reflects a careful calculation of relative risks and income-earning potential for

those who end up in ECA countries. A U.K. Economic and Social Research Council survey of Fujianese Chinese finds that Europe was the second choice for refugees unable to get to Japan or the United States but who wanted to make money abroad within a set time. Fujianese migrants choose their preferred migration destination based on the likelihood of successfully getting there, expected income, and the presence of relatives or friends. Availability of legal residence status seems to be less important, although visa requirements, perceived ease of obtaining refugee status, and amnesties for undocumented migrants are all important in directing Fujianese (and other Chinese) migrants to particular countries at particular times (Economic and Social Research Council 2002).

A survey conducted from May to October 2003 of transit migrants in Azerbaijan (IOM 2004) also determines that the motivations for migration are the result of careful contemplation. Most such transit migrants depart from developing countries in Asia and the Middle East and aim to settle in North America or Western Europe. Some would like to return home when the political and economic situations in their home countries stabilize. Some entered and reside in Azerbaijan legally, while others migrated illegally. Most undocumented entries were through Iran, and were frequently assisted by middlemen. "Push factors"—including conflict and economic difficulties in the countries of origin—were the main motivations for migration. For many, Azerbaijan was attractive owing to its geographical proximity to and cultural similarities with their homeland.

Countries with generous immigration provisions, such as Ukraine, also have the potential to become important crossroads for the transportation of undocumented migrants. A Kennan Institute study (Kennan Institute 2004) focusing on nontraditional immigrants from Asia and Africa identified a set of migrants heading for Western Europe who took advantage of the relatively open immigration system in Ukraine (at least before 1999). They entered both legally and illegally, and hoped to stay a short time before crossing to Western Europe. Some had been duped by traffickers who promised safe passage to Western Europe and then dumped them in Ukraine. In this case as well, migration decisions were greatly influenced by available information from government, extended family, business ties, friends who had studied in Ukraine during Soviet times, communities of compatriots in Ukraine, and organizers of undocumented migration. The majority of Chinese immigrants stated that they relied primarily on small business owners and traders, individuals who were first to take advantage of favorable conditions for entering Ukraine after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Many such migrants had legalized their

status and launched businesses, especially in the food industry and trading at Kiev markets. In contrast, many African migrants were informed about Ukraine as an “easy” transit country to Western Europe by countrymen who had studied in Ukraine during Soviet times.

Profiles of undocumented migrants demonstrate that young, middle-level educated men are more likely to migrate illegally. Most respondents to the Azerbaijan survey were between the ages of 18 and 34 and the majority had completed secondary or vocational schools (with legal migrants having more education on average than irregular migrants) and had worked as low-skilled workers. Among legal migrants, men and women were about equally numerous, whereas most irregular migrants were men (Economic and Social Research Council 2002). The survey of undocumented transit migrants in Ukraine found that about 15,000 such migrants, many young Muslim men, may be located in Kiev. Many were married to Ukrainian women. Two-thirds had a high level of education and had lived in large cities or capitals in their home countries before migrating (Kennan Institute 2004).

Despite the careful calculations made in decisions to migrate, the migration process is long and difficult for most transit migrants. Those interviewed in Azerbaijan had all spent at least one year there, and most were uncertain how much longer they would stay in transit. Few expected to depart for their final destinations within the next year and 11 percent had decided to stay in Azerbaijan if possible. Transit migrants faced a number of difficulties—including shortages of finance, unemployment, poor access to housing and health care, and language barriers—yet were largely satisfied with the overall attitudes of government officials and the local population. More irregular migrants had employment in Azerbaijan than did legal migrants (Economic and Social Research Council 2002).

A major factor inhibiting the further movement of so-called transit migrants was their lack of information. The intended final destinations of most irregulars were the United States, Canada, and Western Europe, whereas most legal migrants intended either to return home (especially to Russia) or to continue on to Western Europe. Most were poorly informed about the rules and regulations for entry to their planned destination countries and living conditions there. Furthermore, illegal migrants who intended to return home were often dependent on outside assistance to do so. Most legal migrants planned to leave Azerbaijan on their own, while most irregular migrants were hoping for assistance from humanitarian organizations, travel agencies, and middlemen (Economic and Social Research Council 2002).

Thus, clearly the migration experience is substantially influenced by the legal status of those who undertake it.

ECA Country Experiences and Policies

Undocumented immigration is by definition difficult to quantify. Currently, there are estimated to be upward of 3 million undocumented immigrants in the EU, and between 1,300 and 1,500 in Russia. The International Organization for Migration reports that “99 percent of labor migration in the Eurasian Economic Union formed of Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Belarus is irregular. Due to their irregular situation, most labor migrants do not benefit from the same protection rights other regular citizens enjoy and are thus more vulnerable to exploitation by underground employers” (IOM 2001, p. 11). Legal status not only affects the relative migration costs and expected benefits, but also changes the underlying economic incentives. Table 1.3 provides a range of estimates of undocumented migration in selected ECA countries, Western Europe, and the United States.

ECA countries act as source, host, and transit countries for undocumented migrants. The concerns associated with the illicit movement, transit, and trade in people are therefore salient across the region. The major host is Russia, most of whose undocumented workers are from the rest of the CIS. However, following accession of the EU-8 to the EU, undocumented migration from western CIS, Russia, the Balkans, and Turkey is becoming an increasing issue for the EU-8 and other countries along its borders. Demographic change is generating a demand for workers in certain sectors and regions, while other migrants are becoming “stuck” as they fail to cross the EU-15 borders. The status of the EU-8 is in transition, but the slowdown in westward emigration in most countries, as well as the opening up of labor markets in some parts of the EU-15, is increasingly regularizing flows. In fact, the expansion of the Schengen Agreement to cover the EU-8 is extending the problem eastward, as irregular migrants are now becoming stuck in the Ukraine.⁷ Turkey hosts a number of undocumented workers mainly from ECA, but also from the Middle East. Taking into account these factors and the role of the ECA as the main overland route to Western Europe, the whole of the region is a major transit route. Transit migrants may come from the region itself, or from the Middle East, Africa, or Asia. It is thought that of the 500,000 trafficked women in Eastern Europe, 300,000 originated in or were transported through the Balkans.

The growth of undocumented migration in the ECA region may be closely tied to the migration policies used to regulate it, and particu-

TABLE 1.3
Estimated Irregular Migrants

(thousands)

Country	Total number of migrants	Estimated number of irregular migrants		Year of estimation	Average % of total migrants
		Max	Min		
North America and Canada					
United States	34,988	10,300	—	2004	29.44
Canada	5,826	200	100	2003	3.43
High-income Europe					
Greece	534	320	—	2003	59.87
Portugal	233	100	—	2003	42.96
Italy	1,634	500	—	2003	30.59
United Kingdom	4,029	1,000	—	2003	24.82
Spain	1,259	280	—	2003	22.24
Belgium	879	150	—	2003	17.06
Germany	7,349	1,000	—	2003	13.61
Switzerland	1,801	180	—	2003	9.99
Netherlands	1,576	163	112	2003	8.72
France	6,277	400	—	2003	6.37
Ireland	310	10	—	2003	3.23
Finland	134	1	—	2003	0.75
Total	26,015	4,104	—		15.78
ECA countries					
Poland	2,088	600	—	2000	28.73
Ukraine	6,947	1,600	—	2000	23.03
Tajikistan	330	60	—	2002	18.16
Czech Republic	236	40	—	2003	16.98
Slovak Republic	51	8	—	1998	15.69
Turkey	1,503	200	—	2001	13.31
Russia	13,259	1,500	1,300	2000	11.31
Kazakhstan	3,028	300	220	2002	9.91
Belarus	1,284	150	50	2000	11.68
Kyrgyz Republic	572	30	—	1998	5.24
Uzbekistan	1,367	30	—	2000	2.19
Lithuania	339	2	—	1997	0.59

Sources: Pew Hispanic Center; IOM; ILO; World Bank; ISTAT; Home Office in United Kingdom; Jimenez (2003); Center on Migration, Policy and Society of the University of Oxford; EU Business Council of Europe; Ministry of Labor in Finland; Sadovskaya (2002); Migration Policy Group; Jandl (2003).

Note: — = not available. Estimation methods are different for each country. Total number of migrants is at the point in 2000 and is estimated by UN (2003).

larly policies in the EU-15 that cap supply of labor below demand. The flow of labor under existing migration agreements is regulated through quotas, as well as a maximum residency period allowed in the receiving country. Quotas often appear small both in relation to the perceived need for labor and in relation to the actual flow of labor migrants. Thus, for instance, Jandl (2003) notes that while 1.11 million foreigners had valid residence permits in Spain in 2000, the 2001 census counted 1.57 million foreigners and the Organisation for Eco-


nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (OECD 2005) estimates that roughly 1 million irregular migrants (around 6 percent of the labor force) will be affected by the recent amnesty. In the United Kingdom, Migration Watch estimates that the number of irregular migrants—including disappeared asylum seekers, visa overstayers, and clandestine entries—is over 100,000 a year; other sources put the figure as high as 500,000.⁸ Jandl (2003) estimates that the stock of irregular migrants in Europe is somewhere between 2.6 million and 6.4 million and the annual number of border apprehensions in EU-15 is close to 300,000.

In light of these numbers, and assuming that most clandestine migrants succeed in finding work, the quotas for labor migration in the bilateral agreements between EU-15 and Central Europe and the Balkans are very small. For example, the Italian agreement on seasonal migration concluded in 1997 with Albania allows 3,000 migrants a year; Germany's quota for guest workers is 15,500 a year (though there are approximately 200,000 seasonal agricultural workers), and the United Kingdom allows an annual inflow of 25,000 from all countries outside of the European Economic Area (OECD 2004). Between the time of EU enlargement in May 2004 and November 2005, there has been an inflow of 156,165 workers from the EU into the United Kingdom and 107,024 into Ireland. Through December 2004, there was a flow of 3,514 workers into Sweden.

Major Migration Partners of the ECA Countries

An important aspect of migration management is understanding the patterns of migration for any particular country. Such an exercise is similar to investigating a country's major foreign trade partners, though usually fewer countries are major senders and receivers of migrants to any particular country than are significant trade partners. Furthermore, the problems with obtaining migration data in many countries in the region make this a somewhat inexact exercise. Fortunately, the largest country in the region, Russia, which is also the main migration partner of most of the other former Soviet Union (FSU) states, has a fairly complete set of migration data, although it does not include the undocumented migrants in the country. Figure 1.11 shows that Russia has been a net recipient of migration from all of the other FSU states except for Belarus, and a net sender to the "far abroad" or to countries outside of the FSU (data underlying these figures are in table 1.6 of appendix 1). The countries from which Russia has received the largest numbers of migrants are those from which

FIGURE 1.11
Russia, Net Migration by Country, 1989–2003




Source: Goskomstat Rossii (selected publications).

there has been a large return of ethnic Russians—Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. However, since 1994, there has been a net immigration to Russia of many other nationalities. If undocumented migrants were included, the numbers representing non-Russians would be even larger.

Three countries outside Russia are the primary destinations for Russian migrants: Germany, Israel, and the United States. Those who migrate consist primarily of Germans, Jews, and Russians, reflecting a combination of ethnic and economic factors driving their decisions to migrate.

The trends shown in the data from Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine (see figure 1.12) are roughly consistent with the data that appear in the data from Russia. Ukraine had net migration losses to Russia while Belarus overall gained migrants. Moldova had net overall losses and net migration losses to the FSU countries, though it did gain migrants from all FSU countries except Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. All three of these countries are net recipients of migrants from all of the other FSU states. As was the case for Russia, the same three countries outside the FSU—Germany, Israel, and the United States—are the primary destinations of migrants from Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. There is anecdotal evidence that an increasing number of

FIGURE 1.12
Major Migration Partners of the CIS Countries



Source: National statistical offices of the ECA countries.

labor migrants from Ukraine and Moldova are departing for the countries of Western Europe.

For the three Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia), mainly titular members of these states have migrated to Russia and the other Slavic states. The data do not demonstrate the fact that this ethnic migration peaked in 1992–93, just after the breakup of the Soviet Union, or that it has declined substantially since then as Russians and other minorities in the Baltics have remained as a result of faster growing economies and impending EU membership. As in other FSU countries, Germany, Israel, and the United States are the primary destinations for migrants from the Baltic states to countries outside the

FSU, although there may have been a broader dispersion of destinations after these states became EU members in 2004.


For the three Caucasus countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), Russia has been the dominant migration destination. There is considerable evidence that these figures represent only a fraction of a much larger undocumented and circular migration from these countries to Russia. This is especially the case with Georgia, where the data on net migration by country only cover the period 1990 to 1992. In contrast, the 2002 population census in Georgia revealed a net migration loss of 1.1 million persons or 20 percent of the population. The migration of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding regions in Azerbaijan is shown in this data set, although such movement was confined to the early 1990s. The United States is the primary destination outside the FSU for migrants from Armenia, with most of these joining the already large Armenian diaspora community there, while Israel remains a top Azerbaijani destination.

For the five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), Russia again dominates as a migration destination, as migration turnover to other FSU states is rather minimal. There is, however, some tentative evidence that Kazakhstan is becoming a favored migration destination for persons from the other Central Asian countries. From both Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, there were large migrations of ethnic Germans to Germany. From Kazakhstan, over 800,000 Germans left and from the Kyrgyz Republic, nearly 100,000. These movements were the remnants of both voluntary and forced migrations of Germans to Central Asia during the Soviet period.

Figure 1.13 shows the major migration patterns of the largest western ECA country, Poland. As can be seen, Poland is losing people to many developed countries (albeit to varying degrees) and remains a net emigration country. Its largest losses are to neighboring Germany, the United States, and Canada, where there are already large Polish diaspora populations as a result of past migrations. The figure for Germany is likely an underestimate because many Poles can travel rather easily to Germany. This figure encompasses the period before Poland became an EU member and thus does not include Poles working in the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Sweden. Many of them would not likely be included in these totals, because such labor migrants generally do not view their departure from Poland to be permanent.

Figure 1.14 provides data on the main migration partners of Hungary, Romania, the Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic. According to these data, Hungary is a net recipient of migrants from nearly all listed countries, with especially large numbers coming from Romania,

FIGURE 1.13

Poland: Net Migration by Country, 1992–2003

Source: Migration Policy Institute; OECD SOPEMI 2003; and German Federal Statistical Office.

Yugoslavia, and other countries that housed ethnic Hungarians after present-day Hungary was carved out of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Romania shows population losses to nearly every other country, with especially large losses to Germany, where many Romanians have gone for work. The only country from which Romania is gaining migrants is its close ethnic neighbor, Moldova. The Czech Republic has been a net recipient of people from other countries, with the bulk of in-migration coming from the Slovak Republic (which had been a part of Czechoslovakia until 1993). The Slovak Republic itself is a net recipient from all listed countries except the Czech Republic.

Future Migration Trends in the Region


One of the themes of this report is that both economic and demographic incentives affect the motivation to migrate for ECA and neighboring countries. This section describes the demographic implications for future migration flows in this region.

Future Migration Patterns in the EU and Neighboring Countries

A combination of income convergence and demographic change suggests that the potential for large-scale migration from western ECA to

FIGURE 1.14

Major Migration Partners of Selected Western ECA Countries




Source: Walmsley, Ahmed, and Parsons (2005).

the EU and other neighboring countries is limited. The richest countries in western ECA have already begun to be net immigration countries. This suggests that the experience of most Western European countries that are net recipients of migrants is likely to become the norm in most western ECA countries with income convergence and EU membership. Even with no convergence, changes in migration patterns appear inevitable.

With the exception of Albania, all western ECA countries are forecast to experience population declines between now and 2050. The total population of these countries peaked in 1990 at 130 million and is projected to decline by 19 percent to 104 million by mid-century. As shown in figure 1.15, western ECA source countries are often projected to have larger population declines than those in Western Europe. The population of Western Europe is expected to increase from its current size of 397 million to a peak of 407 million in 2030 before declining to 400 million in 2050. For western ECA, a decline in the working-age population and a corresponding increase in those over age 65 will create a demand for workers from abroad. The more prosperous western ECA countries may be able to source some of these workers from the rest of the region. However, for the region as a whole, demand will have to be met from elsewhere, probably CIS, Africa, and Asia. Whether these flows are legal or undocumented will depend on immigration legislation.

While the total population of Western Europe is expected to rise slightly between now and mid-century as a result of the current age structure of these countries and expected demographic trends, the working-age population in these countries is expected to decline substantially. Of course, the largest variable in future European migration

FIGURE 1.15
Population Size of Western Europe, Western ECA, and Turkey, 1950 to 2050



Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision (<http://www.un.org/esa/population/unpop.html>).


patterns in both Western Europe and western ECA is Turkey, in which most of the future population growth and additions to the labor force in Europe are expected to take place. Because of its younger age structure and higher fertility rates, Turkey is expected to grow by 33 million between now and 2050 to a total of 101 million, nearly the size of the other western ECA countries combined. Turkey, with an increase of 16 million in its working-age population, could produce sufficient migration to cover the 12 million person population deficit in the EU.

Future Migration Patterns in the Former Soviet Union

Economic factors such as differences in per capita income drive migration patterns among the post-Soviet states in the short term. These will continue to be important, but demographic factors also will play an important role. Figure 1.16 shows the population and expected population of the FSU states over the period 1950–2050. The countries are grouped into the northern FSU—the Slavic and Baltic states and Moldova, and the southern FSU states—Central Asia and the Caucasus. The northern states as a group are characterized by continued low fertility, aging populations, an excess of deaths over births, and declining populations. The group's population peaked in 1990 and is expected to decline over the next half century by about one-third to 149 million. By contrast, the southern FSU states have younger populations, above replacement-level fertility, and continued growing populations. As a group, these countries nearly tripled in size, from 25 million in 1950 to 72 million in 2000. While growth is declining, the momentum built into the age structure of these populations will cause their continued growth to 93 million in 2050.

Differential rates of population growth (or decline) do not necessarily imply that there will be migration from the high-growth to low-growth areas but do present a precondition to that effect. While the northern FSU states will have declining working-age populations in even greater numbers than their overall population declines, most of the southern FSU states, with their “youth bulges,” will have growing working-age populations with economies not growing fast enough to supply jobs. Given their geographic proximity and common historical legacy, it would be only natural that the youth of the southern FSU would look north for jobs, and as mentioned above, there is ample evidence that they are doing so. Furthermore, historical legacy contributes to the selection of migration destinations. The Soviet Union was an almost self-contained migration space; the interconnectedness of FSU countries may cause people to favor destinations in that area over others.

FIGURE 1.16

Population Size of the Northern and Southern FSU States, 1950 to 2050


Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision Population Database (<http://www.un.org/esa/population/unpop.htm>).

Note: The northern FSU consists of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. The southern FSU consists of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

A recent United Nations study examined the issue of using “replacement migration” as a policy measure to address declining and aging populations.⁹ The EU and Russia were included in the study, as were other countries—including France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States—that face similar trends of declining and aging populations. The population declines projected by 2050 in these countries range from 17 percent (Moldova) to 52 percent (Estonia). Countries with aging and declining populations face a number of policy dilemmas, including appropriate retirement ages, pension system reform, and health care for the elderly; support levels and ratios between working and pension-age populations; labor force participation; and possible replacement migration and the integration of immigrant populations. In contrast to these other possibilities, replacement migration refers to the principle of using international migration to offset declines in total population, working-age population, or population aging.

Figure 1.17 shows the combination of natural increase (the difference between births and deaths) and net migration for Russia for the period 1980–2015. During the 1980s, Russia’s population was growing as a result of both demographic and migratory factors. Starting in 1992 and expected to continue for the foreseeable future, the number of deaths has exceeded the number of births. Migration into Rus-

FIGURE 1.17
Russia: Net Migration and Natural Increase, 1980–2015



Source: Goskomstat Rossii.

Note: Data are actuals from 1980 to 2003 and projected from 2004 to 2015.

sia spiked sharply in the 1990s following the breakup of the Soviet Union and has declined sharply since then (at least documented migration). If these trends continue, Russia’s population will decline and age rapidly. For Russia to maintain the size of its total and working-age populations, allowing migration seems to be the only policy option.

Under the medium-variant scenario used in the study, the EU is projected to have a net migration of 13.5 million and Russia to have a net migration of 5.4 million between 2000 and 2050. To maintain the population size as it was in 1995 using migration alone would require a net migration of 47.9 million into the EU and 24.9 million into Russia during that period. Maintaining the same size working-age population would require a net migration of 79 million into the EU and 35.8 million into Russia. For comparison’s sake, there was a net migration of about 8.8 million into the EU and about 3.3 million into Russia during the 1990s. Furthermore, for Russia this was a period of extraordinary change and unprecedented migration that is not likely to be repeated.

For the EU, Russia, and the other large aging and declining populations in the UN study, it is obvious that the needed replacement migration levels are far above levels that are politically and socially plausible. Even low levels of migration will require very careful political and social balancing acts in Russia, the other northern FSU countries, and other major migration destinations. Policies must be designed to accommodate these new migration realities in both destination and originating countries, and, most importantly, the dynamic fluctuations between the two. There is evidence that Russia and some of the other FSU states are facing up to this new migration reality in the region and taking steps to regularize it.

Endnotes

1. Much of the migration data upon which this chapter is based is contained in appendix 1.
2. Estimates as of March 2004 are that there are 10.3 million undocumented migrants in the United States and each year another 700,000 to 800,000 unauthorized enter the country, which is about the same size as those who migrate legally to the United States (Passel 2005).
3. The figure for Armenia, which includes those not indicating their place of birth, is likely a large overestimate because of the problems with the census, which was conducted in January 1989, just after the devastating earthquake in December 1988.
4. For more on the fertility decline in the ECA region, see Heleniak (2005).
5. Turkmenistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina are not included because of the suspected migration data problems mentioned above.
6. To ensure comparability, the data are taken from one source, UNICEF's TransMONEE database, which collects data from the national statistical offices of the 27 transition ECA countries, not including Turkey.
7. The Schengen Agreement originally was a state treaty to end internal border checkpoints and controls among European countries. Today the Schengen system is part of EU legislation regulating border control, visa and admission and nonadmission standards, as well as the joint Schengen Information System. The 15 current Schengen countries include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. All these countries except Norway and Iceland are EU members. The name "Schengen" originates from the small town in Luxembourg where the agreement was signed in 1985.
8. Data from the U.K. Home Office. Source at <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1572533,00.html>, retrieved June 22, 2005.
9. United Nations Population Division 2001. The study uses the 1998 Revision of UN population projections as a baseline. The European Union defined in the report was the EU-15.